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THE CONCEPTION OF DUTY IN PERSONAL
INJURY CASES IN NEW YORK
ARON STEUER*
The first governing factor in determining whether a right of action
exists in favor of a person injured against a particular other person is
whether the latter owed any duty to the former. By "duty" is meant
a legal requirement that the person sought to be held liable should
have done something or refrained from doing something which action
or forbearance would have prevented the particular mishap to the
individual in question. If there is such a requirement in the law
obligating the defendant to the plaintiff the former "owes a duty"
to the latter. If no such duty is owed to the injured person he can-
not recover. The simplicity of the foregoing is in many instances as
nothing to the complexity of determining whether a duty is owed.
Early in the development of the law of the State of New York a
rule was pronounced the application of which went very far to allay
the numerous questions which may arise on this troublesome and
fundamental point: A duty arises only where the defendant is re-
quired to act or refrain in regard to- the subject matter either by
statute or by contract with the plaintiff.' While hardly the cutter of
every Gordian knot this precept went far towards unravelling many of
the questions which could entangle the bar. Its difficulty can be traced
to the fact that it failed to continue to reflect the social thought of the
community. The diligent will no doubt unearth the fact that the ven-
erable case referred to has never been overruled nor has the austere
simplicity of its ruling ever been questioned and this despite numerous
references in subsequent decisions. Perhaps admiration for a tenet of
law which resolves instead of creating doubts has induced the highest
court to decide otherwise without reference to its aged citation.
Whatever the cause the rule stated no longer limits the instances in
which a duty is owed.2
Accidents happen in many ways. Classification cannot be com-
plete but an effort to arrive at the rules of law governing the existence
of duty can be assisted by considering certain groups of cases where
the facts have some common denominator. Certain problems are met
with greater frequency in certain kinds of cases. The question of
*Judge of the City Court of the City of New York.
'The Mayor of Albany vs. Cunliffe, 2 N. Y. 165 (1849).
2Augustine vs. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928) is a perfect
illustration of a contra case to The Mayor, etc. vs. Cunliffe (supra) yet it quotes
the early case with apparent approval.
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duty arises often in the action brought by the employee of a sub-
contractor for injuries received from some defect in the building
against the owner of the premises or a main contractor. Two facts
always appear in such cases and present the kernel of the question.
They are, first, the plaintiff is rightfully on the premises; second, the
defendant has no contractual relation with the plaintiff. These facts
at once present the question-Can tLere be a duty to a person right-
fully and even expectedly exposed to the defendant's negligence to
whom the defendant is under no statutory or contractual duty? The
answer given by the decisions is that these facts alone present no
liability. The duty in such circumstances is solely to provide a safe
place to work. This is the duty owed to the defendant's own em-
ployees.3 Stripped of other facts the situation presents no duty to the
employees of others.4 Where however the general contractor under-
takes to supply a particular structure (as a scaffold) for the em-
ployees of a subcontractor he is under a duty to use reasonable care
in the selection of materials and the like and the builder of such
structure (as distinct from the owner or general contractor), where
the nature of it implies that negligence in construction would be
imminently dangerous to persons using it, is under a duty to use due
care in its construction.5 Of course if the owner himself puts up the
structure his responsibility is that of the builder. 6 The duty resulting
is not contractual in its origin nor does it come into being as an ex-
tension of the contract relationship. Its existence is predicated
solely on the anticipation of imminent danger from a defective con-
struction.7 The same rules apply to the negligent repair of a structure
as to its construction.8 There are situations where a duty has been
founded on an extension of the contractual relationship. For instance
where the defendant adopts a course of conduct which he has reason
to believe will be relied on by those coming on the premises and which
if changed would be dangerous to them, there is a duty owed those
people not to deviate from that course.9 In other words the relation-
ship is extended from those contracting with the defendant to include
3Heilback vs. Consumers Brewery, 207 N. Y. 133, ioo N. E. 599 (1912).
'Thaney vs. A. Frederick & Sons Co., 44 Misc. 134, 89 N. Y. Supp. 787 (Sup.
Ct. 1904).
5Devlin vs. Smith, 89 N.Y., 470, xx Abb. N. C. 322 (1882).
6Cook vs. The President, etc., of the New York Floating Dry Dock Co., I
Hilton 436 (N. Y. 1857).
7Swan vs. Jackson, I55 Hun 194,7 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1889).
8Kahner vs. Otis Elevator Co., 96 App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. Supp. i85 (ist Dept.
1904).
'O'Leary vs. Erie Railroad Co., x69 N. Y. 289, 62 N. E. 346 (i9oi), reversing
5i App. Div. 25, 64 N. Y. Supp. 511 (4th Dept. i9oo).
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those with whom he is necessarily in contact and the duty he owes
them is not to perform his contract to provide a safe place to work
but to maintain, once he has established it, the same course of action
provided an element of danger would attend discontinuance or change
in that course.
A second group of cases presenting troublesome points on this
question deals with the injuries received from a latent defect in an
article purchased by the plaintiff from a third party. The general
rule may be safely stated to be that if the article sold is not a danger-
ous instrumentality in itself there is no liability on the part of the
manufacturer even though he conceals the defect.' 0 In other words
a manufacturer of articles not dangerous in themselves owes no duty
to those with whom he has not contracted. Where however it is
apparent that a defect in construction would make the article immi-
nently dangerous to a large number of people besides the purchaser
the article becomes dangerous in itself and attached to its manu-
facture is a duty to use care extending to all who may come in contact
with it." It is extremely difficult to define what brings an article
into the classification "imminently dangerous." Conceivably faulty
manufacture may turn the most harmless contrivance into a con-
cealed pitfall. A rule of reason has been adopted limiting the in-
clusion to those things which experience has shown are prone to
danger and excluding the article whose use anticipates no likelihood
of injufr-and this regardless of the fact that the instant case may
show the innocent article to have caused severe injury.1 2
Two classes of cases are frequently confused with the "dangerous
article" actions above discussed. One is the liability of the owner of
personalty for defects in his property causing injury. Briefly the rule
is that the duty is limited to those articles which are dangerous in
themselves and where the defect arose while the article was in the
possession of the owner.13 The other class of case is that of a remote
purchaser against a canner or bottler of foodstuffs for alien substances
in the container. There the duty is to use due care not to allow the
alien substance to be inserted.1 4
10Kuelling vs. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 88 App. Div. 309, 84 N. Y. Supp. 622
(4th Dept. 19O3), new trial denied 94 App. Div. 613, 88 N. Y. Supp. 11o5 (4th
Dept. 1904).
nStatler vs. Ray Manufacturing Co., 125 App. Div. 69, io9 N. Y. Supp. 172
(4th Dept. 19o8).
12Jaronic vs. Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302 (3rd
Dept. 1928).
13Finan vs. Valvaline Oil Co., 51 Misc. 292, IO N. Y. Supp. 1087 (Sup. Ct. 19o6).
14Cook vs. People's Milk Co., 90 Misc. 34, 252 N. Y. Supp. 465 (Sup. Ct. 2925).
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A very interesting class of injury cases are those usually designated
as in "nuisance." They are, for the most part, actions against owners
of real estate for injuries befalling passers-by due to a defect in the
land, building, or the appurtenances of either. Any such defect which
is inimical to the safety of those coming in contact with it is styled a
"nuisance." The recognition that such a cause of action existed is as
old as any theory of obligation known to our law. Yet its principles,
categorically denied in the early negligence cases, are as liberal as the
most advanced conception of duty. The duty is owed by the obli-
gated occupier of the land to all persons rightfully in or near the
premises. It is to build the prenises in such a manner that no threat
of imminent danger to those persons lies.15 There are also duties in
regard to maintenance-first, not to allow a dangerous condition to
continue in a building which one has purchased ;16 second, not to allow
a nuisance to arise through neglect of the premises.17  A breach of
the latter duty, it should be noted, is not chargeable to an owner who
has leased the premises for any dereliction occurring while he is out of
possession without his knowledge, 18 providing, of course, that the
lease does not put on him the duty of making repairs. 9 . Where
the lease contains such a provision the landowner's duty to third
persons is not thereby increased but to avoid a circuity of actions
suit against him is permitted. The duties rest on no statutory or con-
tractual foundation except in those cases where the defect is due to
construction which violates a statute.2 1 In order to determine the
basis for the extraordinary duty placed on the owner or occupier of
realty it is important to know just what it is. Where the nuisance
arises from a dangerous construction the owner at the time of the
construction, any intermediate owner who suffered the condition to
continue unabated and who transferred ownership voluntarily for
profit, and the owner at the time of the accident, are alike subject
to the consequences of the duty.2' By "profit" is meant a benefit
derived in the transfer because of the existence of the nuisance."
In total they present an incident consequent on the privileges of land
ownership and dominion, an obligation to the public which subject to
certain rules of reason accrues with the dominion in the realty.
16Walsh vs. Mead, 8 Hun 387 (1876).
16McGrath vs. Walker, 64 Hun 179, I8 N. Y. Supp. 915 (1892).17Morris vs. Barrisford, 9 Misc. 14,29 N.Y. Supp. i7 (1894).
'sUggla vs. Brokaw, 117 App. Div. 586, io2 N. Y. Supp. 857 (ist Dept. 1907).
19Ahearn vs. Steele, et al, x 15 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889).
20Congreve vs. Morgan, 4 Duerr 439 (1855).21Wilkes vs. N.Y. Telephone Co., 243 N. Y. 351, 153 N. E. 444 (1926).
s2Slavitsvs.Morris Park Estates,98 Misc.314,J62 N.Y. Supp. 888(Sup.Ct. 1917).
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Liability under this last discussed theory has been sought to be
imposed upon landowners for conditions on the public sidewalk
adjacent to their premises. Particularly where snow or ice from
rainwater has accumulated on the walk after falling from the de-
fendant's building persons injured by this condition have brought
suit. The primary liability in such cases being on the city, as herein-
after discussed, liability could only attach where the construction of
the abutting building contributed to the accumulation. The courts
have recognized the natural property of the elements to flow off
buildings onto the sidewalk and have held that where there is nothing
unusual in the construction of the building to aggravate this natural
property there is no liability.2 Devices designed to direct the flow
of rain, such as drainpipes, if constructed with care and not in vio-
lation of law impose no liability even if the discharge from them
coagulates on the walk.2 There is no duty on the householder in
regard to the condition of the public highway. On the contrary he is
entitled to build lawful structures, such as fences, to keep snow from
drifting on his property even though it is reasonably foreseeable
that the structure would cause dangerous drifts to accumulate on the
highway.25 An extraordinary or wrongful construction, however, in-
ducing a discharge on the highway would be different as such a con-
struction constitutes a threat of danger beyond that to be expected
from the natural accumulation of snow or formation of ice and would
therefore be a nuisance.21 In such a case the landowner becomes a
joint tort feasor with the municipality, the latter in permitting the
continuance of the condition being negligent in its duty regarding
highways.27 An interesting situation, legally, arises where the con-
struction would import no imminent danger if snow were promptly
removed. These facts present a nice question-whether the liability
is in nuisance or negligence. Injury can only result from the con-
struction (nuisance) plus the failure to remove (negligence). The
solution to the problem as far as concerns questions of pleading and
proof is that either theory suffices on proof of the facts.28 It is likely,
however, that a nuisance action could not be supported against an
owner out of possession or a former transferor of the property. The
2Moore vs. Gadsden, 87 N. Y. 84 (I88x).
24Wenzlick vs. McCotter, 87 N. Y. 122 (I88I).
25Cooney vs. Northern Central Railway Co., i8o App. Div. 675, 167 N. Y.
Supp. 865 (4th Dept. 1917).
26Kleinmier vs. State of New York, io StateDept. Repts. 113 (1916).
27Klepper vs. Seymour House Corp. 246 N. Y. 85, I58 N. E. 29 (1927).
2SVenable vs. Consolidated Dry Goods Co., 225 App. Div. 202, 232 N. Y. Supp.
404 (2nd Dept. 1929).
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net effect of such a legal situation is of real significance and of itself is
no mean indication of our present concept of duty.
Apparently similar to the duty owed by the owner of realty is the
obligation of a municipal corporation in regard to its streets. It is
responsible to those rightfully using them for any injuries caused by
encumbrances allowed to remain there.29  This duty depends on
control. The duty in regard to defects in construction or mainte-
nance is quite different. This is an obligation to the public arising
from the municipality's statutory duties concerning its streets."0 It
depends strictly on the statutory obligation to build or maintain the
highway-so that when the municipality is excused from such obli-
gation, as where a different agency is created for that purpose there is
no duty on its part.3 Conversely the responsibility of the city
is absolute and where the defect exists liability therefor attaches
even though the fault is that of another. 2 However, it should be
noted that though the origin of the duty is the statutory obligation
above noted and this controls the instances in which a duty arises,
the nature of the duty, once it is seen to exist, is not statutory. If it
were the duty would be owed only to those using the highway for
travel. The law is that the highway must be sufficient for all inci-
dental uses to which it might be reasonably put by persons passing
along it." No reason for this odd situation has been discovered.
The results reached are beneficial, which is an answer if not an ex-
planation for a logical inconsistency.
The liability extends solely to those thoroughfares which the
municipality is required by law to maintain.4 And it is subject to
such statutory conditions, such as notice, as the legislature may
fix.35 Liability, however, will attach even though all the formal
steps necessary to acquisition are not strictly complied with36 and has
been imposed in regard to highways which have been acquired
through no more formal means than acknowledgment of long use by
the municipality. 37 The test of liability is whether the use by the
29Sewell vs. City of Cohoes, 75 N. Y. 45 (1878).
aOHutson vs. City of New York, 5 Sandf. 289 (i85I)
3 Hickok vs. Trustees of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 (1853).
32Wendell vs. Mayor of Troy, 39 Barb. 329 (1862).
33Langlois vs. City of Cohoes, 58 Hun 226 (189o).
"4Ehle vs. Town of Minden, 7o App. Div. 275, 74 N. Y. Supp. 9o3 (3rd Dept.
1902).
35Sprague vs. City of Rochester, 52 App. Div. 53, 64 N. Y. Supp. 846 (4th
Dept. igoo).
36Seymour vs. Vil. of Salamanca, 137 N. Y. 364,33 N. E. 3o4 (1893).
3Ivory vs. Town of Deerpark, I i6 N. . 476, 22 N. E. io8o (3889).
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public has been acquiesced in by the city.3 8 If responsibility attaches
through dedication and acceptance the liability is to maintain a
regular street with proper grades, entrances and the like even though
this would entail changes in the streets already maintained. 9 And
liability attaches for any portions of such streets which were privately
constructed prior to acceptance.4 0
There is no public liability involved in the routing or planning of a
street. Butthe duty to maintain is not met by a construction which
is incomplete even though that construction accords with the plans
for it. 41 Where the public necessity demands streets may be torn up
and consequently rendered unsafe for traffic. In such instances the
duty to those using the streets obligates the city to erect warnings and
safeguards about the torn up area" and to maintain them of sufficient
strength that the travelling public may be protected from the con-
sequent danger. 3 Or the entire street may be closed and if this is the
step called for by the circumstances it is a breach of duty not to
take it."
An interesting group of cases in a field closely allied to the fore-
going concern the duty of the municipality in regard to land con-
tiguous to the highways and not physically differentiated from it.
If such ground has been used as the highway to the knowledge of the
city it is under a duty to demark the limits of the highway and failing
that it is responsible for any defect in the bordering. area.41 An
exception to the rule is found where the erection of a fence or other
means of demarkation would produce a condition of danger in the
highway.4 Strictly speaking there is no responsibility of duty in
connection with the neighboring land. The duty of maintaining the
highway is held not to be discharged properly unless the limits of
the highway are fixed. The origin of the duty in these cases is the
same as in those discussed immediately prior though an additional
step of judicial logic is required before it comes into view.
In that class of cases which has become the most numerous-
vehicular accidents-the question of duty seldom arises., By statute
3 Schafer vs. Mayor, 12 App. Div. 384, 42 N. Y. Supp. 744 (ist Dept. x896).3
'Porter vs. Village of Attica, 33 Hun 6o5 (1884).
40McVee vs. City of Watertown, 92 Hun 3o6,,36 N. Y. Supp. 870 (x896).
4 Hubbell vs. City of Yonkers, 35 Hun 349 (1885).
4Grove vs. City of Rochester, 39 Hun 5 (1886).
41Lane vs. City of Syracuse, 12 App. Div. i 18, 42 N. Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dept.
1896).
14Schomer vs. City of Rochester, 15 Abb. N. C. 57 (1884).
45Jewhurst vs. City of Syracuse, 3O8 N.Y. 3o3, 15 N. E. 4o9 (i888).
46Veeder vs. Village of Little Falls, IOO N. Y. 343,3 N. E. 3o6 (1885).
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every driver of a vehicle is required to drive carefully so that a duty is
owed to all the world. The question does come up where the de-
fendant is a municipal corporation being sued for injuries committed
by its firemen while driving the apparatus. Here the duty is over-
ridden for the greater public good and while theoretically it exists,
public policy prevents the consequences attendant upon a breach.
Another road of reasoning reaching the same end is that the firemen
are not agents of the city but its officers engaged on a public duty and
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to their acts.4 7
The general situation in regard to the plethora of actions which
arise from injuries to passengers in public conveyances is very similar
to that in vehicular accidents. The question of duty is absent for the
reason that the contractual obligation to carry the passenger safely
imposes a duty under any theory of origin of duty. The question, if
one arises, is rather the existence of the contractual obligation 8 and
the law of contracts rather than that of torts is involved for decision.
Gerierally it is beyond the scope of this article to quest deeply into
these problems, except where some diversion from the contract rule
can be noted. Such an instance is the ultra vires operation of a
carrier by a municipality. Generally acceptance of the profits of the
ultra vires transaction vitiates this defense. Acceptance of the fare
does not.49 The reason probably is to be found in the absence of the
element of unjust enrichment. A similar contract action is really in
quasi-contract. In tort no such avenue of approach for the plaintiff
exists.
An unusual duty is put upon keepers of resorts such as bathing
beaches and the like to give warning of the presence of danger.0
This duty is unusual because very few legal consequences flow from
absolute negation or inactivity. The strangeness is lessened when it
is realized that the duty comes from the contractual duty of the
resort owner to his patrons to provide a safe place for them. This
restricts the logical horizon to which consequence for inaction might
be extended with results which would provide wide scope to the in-
genious.
Additional examples of injury cases can be easily found. Such
seeking is unnecessary to the purpose of this article. The answer
given by the above decisions should tell what the conception of duty
is. It remains to put that conception into words. The legal mind
47See Smith vs. City of Rochester, 76 N. Y. 5o6 (1879).
48Norton vs. WiswaU, 26 Barb. 618 (x858).
49Diluvio vs. City of New York, 73 Misc. 122, 132 N. Y. Supp. 531 (Sup. Ct.
1911).
5 Augustine vs. Town of Brant, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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demands a rule, a formula for guidance, but like the prophet in the
wilderness there is no sign. We will start from the convenient rule
that obligation for injury rests on a basis of contract relationship or
statutory requirement. But this does completely limit the law. Nor
is the path to the present view along the line of extension of these
bases. Granted that examples of such extensions exist in the instances
given above, but the way is not that way. The logician in the law
has only slightly extended our horizon of obligation. Whether we
should say that we have a new and different theory of duty or whether
we should recognize certain of the above groups as exceptions to the
general rule is perhaps academic and probably unanswerable. As
pointed out in those classes of cases a consequent duty is conceived
from social relationship-the expectancy of contact with other
persons. To translate into terms more familiar to legal utterance, a
duty to use care is owed to all persons to whom it is reasonably ex-
pectant that injury would result from the failure to use such care.
Particularly in the faulty construction and latent defect cases we have
adopted such a viewpoint. It has not been made to apply to every
case-the tenacious grip of precedent is not that easily loosened. But
in those groups it is now the exceptional case which is controlled by
the contract-statute rule. A different social conception has dis-
covered injustice in the old rule. An obligation similar to that in
nuisance cases was required to meet the needs of the community.
And it was promulgated in the characteristic manner of all judicial
pronouncement. As far as the sources reveal, that is the conception
of duty in our law.
